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Chapter 19

THE SIXTH
COMMANDMENT
EXODUS 20:13

You SHALL NOT

DEUTERONOMY 5:17

You SHALL NOT MURDER.

MURDER.
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"Thou Shalt Not Kill"The First Commandment
of the Just War Tradition
Gary M Simpson

L

"Thou shalt not kill" is the first commandment of the "just war tradition." 1 This
assertion, at first glance, seems shockingly unwarranted. After all, war is without
exception about killing, even a war that is justifiably undertaken and prosecuted
using "just war tradition" criteria. War either violates God's commandment or
falls outside the commandment's purview. In his Large Catechism, Martin

I.\,

I. I follow'frrence Fmheim's argument regarding "kill" as the most adequate translation of the commandment (Exodus [lllC; Louisville, KY: John Knox, 1991], 232-33). !'or brief primers on the basics
of just war theory, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War," in The Westmimter Dictionary of Christimz
Ethics, ed. J. Childress and J. Macquarrie (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 328-29; and A. E Holmes,
"Just-War Theory," in New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Ptmora! IlJeology, ed.
D. Atkinson et al. (Downers Grove, IL: !nterVarsity, 1995), 521-23. !'or thorough standard accounts
of the just war tradition, see Paul Ramsey, IlJe Just W't1r (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968);
Michael Walzer, Just mu! Unjust W{1rs: A i'vfora! Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic
Books, 1977); James Turner Johnson, just Wr1r 1h1t!itio1t and the Restraint ofW'tzr: A Mom! and Historical Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). For my own description and analysis of
the just war tradition and its criteria, sec "Puckering Up for Postmodern Kissing: Civil Society and the
Lutheran Emwinement of Just Peace/Just War," Journal ofLuthmm Ethics 2, no. 11 (November 2002),
n.p.; and "Congregational Strategies for Invigorating Lutheranism's Just Peacemaking'lradition," ]011r11tt! ofLttthemn Ethics 3, no. 7 (July 2003), n.p., http://www.elca.org/scriptlib/dcs/jle/search.asp.

249

250

Contemporary Reflections on the Commandments

Luther takes the latter position: "Therefore neither God nor the government is
included in this commandment, nor is their right to take human life abrogated. "2
Contrary to popular opinion, the just war tradition takes God's "not kill"
command as its basic presupposition. It is founded upon a strong underlying
presumption against war and thus is fundamentally grounded in restraint.
Luther even encodes this presumption in the title of his 1527 treatise V(fhether
Soldiers, Too, Gm Be Sttved. 3 When made explicit, this presumption paradoxically
strengthens Luther's insight that God exempts government from this commandment's prohibition.
Luther provides a fine case study for establishing God's "not kill" command
as the warrant for the just war tradition's presumption against war. The reach of
the command, moreover, includes just peacemaking. My argument will treat, in
order, the following four issues: (1) Luther's argument for excluding political
authority from the commandment's purview, (2) Luther's proscription against
the political authority's prosecution of holy war crusade, (3) the just war tradition's opposition to "war realism" traditions, and (4) the commandment's requirement of just peacemaking.

GOD'S "NOT I<ILe' COMMAND AND THE OFFICE
OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY
During its first three centuries, the church addressed ever more forthrightly the
question of whether war can be justified in view of God's "not kill" command. 4
Church fathers treated the question of war within the social contexts of their
times and in light of both the teachings of Jesus and the Ten Commandments,
with the former receiving the bulk of attention. Athanasius's treatment of war in
To Amun is a good example:

2. Robert Kolb and Timothy Wengert, ed., 11Je Book of Concord: T'l1e Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), 410.
3. In LW' 46. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops has rightly noted that the
just war tradition entails a "strong presumption against the use of force"; sec T'l1e Harvest ofjustice Is
Sown in Peace (United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1993), http:/ /www.usccb.org/sdwp/
harvest.hem.
4. I cannot here enter into the debate regarding what has become something like "the standard
account." In this account, Jesus was a pacifist and so was the church of the first three centuries.
Then came the Constantinian compromise of the just war. The progressive slide away from pacifism
continued into the era of holy war crusade. Roland Bainton is the most noteworthy proponent
of this account (see Christian Attitudes toward \Viir mu! Peace [New York: Abingdon, 1960]),
which has taken hold not only within the peace church traditions but also within the mainstreams of the just war tradition. James Turner Johnson has undertaken an extensive study and
concluded, "The problem is that this [now standard] account of early Christian history is both
dead wrong and misleading in its depiction of the historical evidence" (711e Quest for l'Mce [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987], 9). Johnson finds rudimentary just war arguments and
attitudes at least 150 years prior to Constantine, thus forestalling a "convenient scapegoat like Constantine to [be the] blame for the alleged loss of moral purity in the Church's attitude to war and the
military" (15).

------------------···•.-
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One is not supposed to kill, but killing the enemy in battle is both lawful
and praiseworthy.... Thus, at one particular time, and under one set of circumstances, an act is not permitted, but when the time and conditions are
right, it is both allowed and condoned. 5

Both Augustine and Aquinas broach the question of justifiable war in their treatments on God's "not kill" command. 6
Luther moves beyond Athanasius's vague reference to the right "time and conditions" by using arguments drawn principally from Augustine, whom Thomas
Aquinas and Calvin also follow. Augustine claims that God's "not kill" command
"allows certain exceptions" because God can indeed authorize killing.7 Aquinas
puts it succinctly: "God has sovereign authority over life and death." 8 God's
authority, then, authorizes political authority to put criminals to death and to
wage war at God's bidding.
Luther's critical theology of political authority emerges over the full course of
his life. Many, though not all, of its basic features are already in place in his wellknown treatise of 1523, Temporttl Authority: 1o W'hat Extent It Should Be Obeyed
(LW' 45:81-129). 9 Luther addresses particular questions put to him by John the
Steadfast, his soon-to-be prince. Now that he had become an ardent defender of
the evangelical cause, John inquired of Luther whether he would be able to exercise the full range of powers of the princely office with a good Christian conscience. John was concerned specifically about the power of "the sword," the
coercive power of last resort that belongs in an exceptional way to political
authority. 10 Some Anabaptist sectarians were perturbing John with certain Bible
passages like "do not resist an evildoer" (Matt 5:39), "never avenge yourselves ...
vengeance is mine" (Rom 12: 19), and "do not repay evil for evil" ( 1 Pet 3:9). Such
texts, claimed the Anabaptists, preclude all true Christians, including those occupying the office of prince, from exercising "the sword," either in a criminal court
5. !'tttrologit1 Graeca, Mignc, 26.1173 (cited in Louis Swift, The D1rly fathers on Wtzr and lvfilitary Service, ed. Thomas Halton [Message of the Fathers of the Church 19; Wilmington, DE: Michael
Glazier, 1983], 95). Hans von Campenhausen cites this passage along with Ambrose's agreement with
Cicero's praise of soldiers' bravery to indicate a "change in view" in early Christian thinking on war
(7rt1ditio11 and Life in the Church [Philadelphia: fortress, 1968], 168).
6. One notable place where Augustine treats the relationship between God's "not kill" command and
justifiable war is in 711e City of God 1.21. Aquinas's treatment of just war can be found in The Com1111mdments ofGod: Conferences on the 7ivo Precepts ofCharity and the 1en Commandments (London: Burns
Oates & Washbourne, 1937), 57-58, and in Summa 771eologiae 2a2ae.64.3~. It is now common for
contemporary theologians to raise the question of just war when treating the Ten Commandments.
7. Augustine, The City ofGod 1.21. For an excellent overview of the relevant issues in Augustine,
Aquinas, and Calvin, sec Lisa Sowle Cahill, Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism, and Just V?'tzr
Iheory (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994), 55-118.
8. Aquinas, S1111m1t1 Theologiae 2a2ae.64.6.
9. For my account of Luther's critical theology of political authority, see "Toward a Lutheran
'Delight in the Law of the Lord': Church and State in the Context of Civil Society," in Church
t111d State: Lttthmm Perspectives, ed. John Stumme and Robert Tuttle (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003),
20-50.
10. "The sword" was that synecdochal figure of speech commonly used in Luther's day to refer
to political authority's coercive power.
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proceeding in order to keep the peace or analogously in a justifiable war. Luther,
like Augustine, draws the analogy between criminal peacekeeping and just war
peacekeeping.
Luther also had to counter the normative medieval interpretation of passages
like those from the Sermon on the Mount. According to that interpretation, a
prince could bear "the sword" and remain a Christian in good conscience because
these teachings applied only to those who were specifically dedicated to "Christian perfection," namely, members of a monastic order or the sacerdotal priesthood. Accordingly, princes need not be held accountable to such high "counsels
of perfection," since they, being lay, remained "common" Christians. Luther
roundly rejected such scholastic, interpretive "wantonness and caprice." Among
Christians there exists no external "class" distinction between the perfect and the
common based on status markers like "outwardly male or female, prince or peasant, monk or layman" (LW 45:88). Here Luther's doctrine of vocation comes into
play. Passages such as those from the Sermon on the Mount "apply to everyone
alike" (LW 45:88).
A second historical factor situates Luther's reflections. In his earlier 1520 treatise To the Christian Nobility ofthe German Nation, Luther appealed to the Christian nobility to take the reform of the church into their own hands, since the
German bishops had not. Luther noted that the political authority of rulers was
not delegated to them hierarchically from the church and its bishops, as the dominant heritage of papal political theology held. His provocative assessment of
political authority left many wondering whether, by so emancipating political
authority from the church, he had ascribed unlimited, totalitarian powers to
political authority. Could princes, with legitimate authority, command as God's
will "whatever they please"? And correspondingly, were their subjects "bound to
obey their rulers in everything" as they would obey God's will (LW 45:83)? Luther
addresses this question in part two of TemportdAuthority. He stakes out the extent
and limits of political authority and its power of the sword (LW 45: 104). According to Luther, political authority has no authorization to coerce faith. In this way,
the subtitle of his treatise is telling: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed. In part
three, Luther offers his own practical advice concerning the exercise of the
prince's office in a Christian manner. His remarks bear the stamp of a political
layperson's imagination, as he himself acknowledges.
Luther begins part one by citing Rom 13: 1-2 and 1 Pet 2: 13-14. These texts
authenticate the constitution of political authority's obligation of"the sword" as
"a godly estate" (LW 45:87) and thereby testify that God is the primary agent
behind "the law of this temporal sword" (LW 45:86). 11 Luther argues that Gen
11. Herc Luther follows Augustine in, e.g., Reply to fa11st11s the l\,f,miche1111, ed. Philip Schaff (The
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 4 [first series]; Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1887), 22.71-76 (pp.
299-302). Aquinas also follows Augustine here (Summa l'l1eologiae 2a2ae.40.1). In reference to the
'Jen Commandments, Luther bases political authority on the commandment "Honor thy father and
thy mother." For an exposition of Luther on this point, see my "'Toward a Lutheran 'Delight in the
Law of the Lord,"' 26-29.
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4: 14-15 and 9:5-6 strengthen the first two texts by emphasizing that the law of
the political sword has "existed from the beginning of the world," after the fall.
Luther interprets, for example, Gen 9:5 in light of the Decalogue's "not kill"
command and Gen 9:6 in relation to God's establishment of political authority
with its power of"the sword" (LU72:139-41). God has found ways to inscribe
this law into the human community from the beginning of time, even though,
he notes, communities have also found ways to have this divine work of the sword
"not carried out." The lex talionis of Exod 21 :23-25, along with verse 14, certifies that Moses "confirmed" this inscribed-from-the-beginning law of the political sword. Matthew 26:52 and Luke 3: 14 also provide confirmation. Luther's
conclusion: "Hence, it is certain and clear enough that it is God's will that the
temporal sword and law be used for the punishment of the wicked and the protection of the upright" (LW 45:87). First Peter 2: 14 (LW 45:86) and Rom 13:3
(LW' 45:91) provide warrant for preventing wickedness and promoting uprightness, the twofold criterion of God's will for the range and exercise of political
authority, including the power of"the sword."
Luther argues that, because of humanity's condition, God constitutes the full
horizon of the first use of the law in general and political authority with its coercive sword. Humanity is composed of both righteous Christians and the unrighteous. Righteous Christians hear and trust the voice of Christ; thus the Holy Spirit
works through their agency, directing the righteous to do right and bear wrong.
By the Spirit, therefore, righteous Christians "do of their own accord much more
than all laws and teachings can demand, just as Paul says in 1 Timothy 1[:9], 'The
law is not laid down for the just but for the lawless"' (H\7 45:89). Throughout
Luther's career, 1 Tim 1:9 remained a hermeneutically significant text. 12 Accordingly, God constitutes the law not with the righteous Christians in view.
Luther was always keen to recognize that many baptized Christians are so in
name only and thus waste the Holy Spirit's agency for conducting their lives in
love of neighbor. "Christians are few and far between (as the saying is)" (LW
45:91). Luther numbers such false Christians among the unrighteous. The
unrighteous, readily in the majority by Luther's calculus, live without the Spirit
of Christ as the core agenr oftheir lives and thus "need the law to instruct, constrain, and compel them to do good" (LW 45:89). 13 Luther remains a wide-eyed
realist about sin and evil. He equally remains a wide-eyed realist about the triune
God's creational resolve to contest against sin and evil for the sake of creation!
For this reason God has provided [the unrighteous] a different government
beyond the Christian estate and kingdom of God. He has subjected them

12. See Gerhard Ebeling, Word and faith (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1963), 73-74.
13. Luther invariably knows that because the old Adam always clings to this life, he is describing
che Christian "to the extent that he is a Christian" (LW26: 134). Sec also Luther's reflections on bpcism and holy communion in the Large Catechism (Kolb and Wengert, The Book of Concord,
456-80). In Temporal A11thorit;1 Luther also cakes up the second (theological or spiritual) use of the
law, whereby the Holy Spirit convicts of sin and drives to Christ. llut the spiritual use of the law is
not our primary concern in this inquiry.
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to the sword so that, even though they would like to, they are unable to practice their wickedness, and if they do practice it they cannot do so without
fear or with success and impunity. (LW' 45:90)

This is the sword that serves as remedy for sin (remedium peccatt). In Vv'hether
Soldiers Too Can Be Sewed, Luther enlarges the sword's purview to include a justified war.
For the very fact that the sword has been instituted by God to punish the
evil, protect the good, and preserve peace (Rom. 13:1-4; 1 Pet. 2:13-14)
is powerful and sufficient proof that war and killing along with all the
things that accompany wartime and martial law have been instituted by
God. (LW' 46:95)

Luther's realism about sin and evil leads him to reflect on possible relationships of power wherein the "wolves, lions, [and] eagles" among us (LW 45:92)the hoarders and inhibitors of God's temporal, creational banquet-would
simply "devour" the "sheep" (LW 45:91)-the most vulnerable among us and,
indeed, all of us in our vulnerabilities. If such a lax situation persists, temporal
life and flourishing would eventually be "reduced to chaos" (H\7 45:91). Always
mindful of oppressive and violent wickedness, the triune God constitutes two
modes of governing the world, each with its own integrity with regard to divine
purpose and power: "the spiritual, by which the Holy Spirit produces Christians
and righteous people under Christ; and the temporal, which restrains the unChristian and wicked so that-no thanks to them-they are obliged to keep still
and to maintain an outward peace" (LW 45:91). Here Luther employs his comprehensive, remarkably enduring, and fruitful distinction between law and gospel
with its accompanying distinction between the triune God's two ways of ruling
the world, often referred to as Luther's two-kingdoms teaching. 14
Following Augustine, Luther notes that even the sword is a temporal work
of love.
[W]hen I think of a soldier fulfilling his office by punishing the wicked,
killing the wicked, and creating so much misery, it seems an un-Christian
work completely contrary to Christian love. I3ut when I think of how it protects the good and keeps and preserves wife and child, house and farm, property, and honor and peace, then I see how precious and godly this work is;
and I observe that it amputates a leg or a hand, so that the whole body may
not perish .... What men write about war, saying that it is a great plague,
is all true. I3ut they should also consider how great the plague is that war
prevents. (LW' 46:96) I 5

14. For a noteworthy, comprehensive American interpretation of Luther's teaching of two kingdoms and two regiments, sec William H. Lazareth, Christir1m in Society: Luther. the Bible, 1111d Socir1!
Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001).
15. See Augustine, "Letter 189 to Boniface," in Sr1int Augustine: Letters, vol. 4 (165-203), trans.
W. Parsons (The Fathers of the Church 30; New York: Fathers of the Church, 1951), 269.
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Luther's view of the integrity of political authority under God critically distinguishes his theological reflection from both the papal theology of his time and the
sectarian account of political authority. Given the divinely constituted integrity of
both governments, "it is out of the question" that Christians should attempt to
govern the whole world or even a single country by the kind of noncoercive, free,
and freeing spiritual governance of the gospel (LW 45:91, 93, 107-8). For this reason, there exists a special Christian vocation that "carefully distinguish [es] between
these two governments. Both must be permitted to remain; the one to produce
righteousness, the other to bring about external peace and prevent evil deeds. Neither one is sufficient in the world without the other" (LW 45:92).
Readied with this two-kingdoms hermeneutic, Luther turns to the significance of Jesus' Sermon on the Mount. Christians are to have no recourse to the
law or to political authority's sword in two types of circumstances: "among themselves" (LW 45:92, 94) and "by and for themselves" (LW 45:94). First, within
their community Christians are not to seek recourse in the law or in the sword
of political authority. Second, Christians have no need for the sword if what is at
stake is only their own well-being (LW 45:95). The second circumstance flows
from another basic distinction in Luther's construal of the relationship of Christians to the sword: the distinction between self and neighbor. 16
Since a true Christian lives and labors on earth not for himself alone but for
his neighbor, he does by the very nature of his spirit even what he himself
has no need of, but is needful and useful to his neighbor. Because the sword
is most beneficial and necessary for the whole world in order to preserve
peace, punish sin, and restrain the wicked, the Christian submits most willingly to the rule of the sword, pays his taxes, honors those in authority,
serves, helps, and does all he can to assist governing authority, that it may
continue to function and be held in honor and fear. Although he has no
need of these things for himself-to him they are not essential-nevertheless, he concerns himself about what is serviceable and of benefit to others,
as Paul teaches in Ephesians 5. (LW' 45:94)

Luther views political authority itself as wholly an office "on behalf of others" (LW
46: 122). A prince who corrupts his office by exercising political authority in order
"to rejoice in his [own] power and wealth and honor, ... [t]hat kind of prince would
start a war over an empty nut and think nothing but satisfying his own will" (ibid.).
Luther argues that these three sets of distinctions-between the triune God's
two ways of ruling, between church and world, and between self and neighbor16. Indeed, this distinction is ubiquitous in Luther's theological and ethical reflection (see, e.g.,
lW' 45:95-96, 101, 103). I3esides Scripture, Augustine is Luther's tutor on the distinction between
for sclfand forother (see Augustine, "Letter 47 to Publicob," in S11imilugustine: letters, vol. 1 [1-82],
trans. W. Parsons [The Fathers of the Church 12; New York: Fathers of the Church, 1951], 230).
Likewise, Ambrose is Augustine's tutor here (see "On the Duties of the Clergy" 3.3.23, in St. Ambrose:
Select W'orhs and letters, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace [Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 10 (second series); [New York: Christian Literature, 1896], 71). It is Ambrose, in fact, who bequeaths to
Augustine the distinction between just and unjust war (see Ambrose, On the Duties of the Clergy
1.35.176-77).
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bring "into harmony" the two sets of biblical texts that on the surface appear contradictory.17 On the one hand, Christians do not resist evil with the sword either
among themselves or for their own survival or gain. On the other hand, Christians are "under obligation to serve and assist the sword by whatever means [they]
can, with body, goods, honor, and soul" in order to resist evil when oppressors
afflict others. "For [the sword] is something which you do not need, but which
is very beneficial and essential for the whole world and for your neighbor";
indeed, "[t]he world cannot and dare not dispense with it" (LW 45:95). By so
serving and assisting even the sword, "in what concerns the person or property
of others," argues Luther, "you govern yourself according to love and tolerate no
injustice toward your neighbor" (LW 45:96).
Christians participate in the whole panoply of the civil use of the law and,
more narrowly, in the office of political authority, including its coercive and
restraining sword, because these exist as God's own "work and creation" (LW'
45:99). They are God's "masks" (larvae dei) for creating and sustaining the temporal life of the world (LW 45:96-100). "For the hand that wields this sword and
kills with it is not man's hand, bur God's; and it is not man bur God who hangs,
tortures, beheads, kills, and fights. All these are God's work and judgment" (LW
46:96). By serving and assisting the office of political authority with its sword,
Christians participate in God's creative agency. It is often with this sense of ardent
participation in God's creative agency that Luther commends "obedience" in reference to temporal authority. Furthermore, because God constitutes political
authority, including the sword, "for the neighbors' good," such authority extends
into the great variety of offices that "arrest, prosecute, execute, and destroy the
wicked and [that] protect, acquit, defend, and save the good" (LW 45: 103).
Finally, because divinely constituted political authority exists to serve the neighbors' good, Christians can even "use their office like anybody else would his trade,
as a means of livelihood" (LW 45: 103).
We have concentrated so far on how Luther addresses the first two of the four
classic questions posed within the general framework of the just war tradition,
the pacifism question and the authority question, about which John the Steadfast sought Luther's advice. Luther's response is typical of the just war tradition
in general. It shares with the pacifist tradition a first principle or command: the
strong presumption against violence and war and the quest for peace. In James
Turner Johnson's words,
The difference-and it is a crucial one-between Christian just war theory
and Christian pacifism ... resides in which second principle is added to the
common attitude of opposition to war and violence. For Christian pacifists
this principle comes in the form of separation .... For Christian theorists
17. One might compare and contrast Luther's three distinctions with the following four strategic distinctions cited: higher and lower standards of conduct, for oneself and for others, inner and
outer disposition, and private and public actions (James F. Childress, "Moral Discourse about War
in the Early Church," in Pet1ce, Politics, and the People ofGoel, ed. Paul Peachey [Philadelphia: Fortress,

1986], 126-31).
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of just war ... the second principle was that Christians might responsibly
rake part in securing the temporal goods represented by the state. 18

We have seen that Luther exempts political authority from the purview of God's
"not kill" command when the pacifism and authority questions are under discussion. We will see below, however, that Luther will reintroduce God's "not kill"
command when the inquiry shifts to the cause question.

POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND HOLY WAR CRUSADE
In part two of Temporal Authority, Luther addresses the question of the "limits"
of political authority. Luther's analysis of these limits broaches issues often examined under the cause question within the just war tradition. Luther probes
whether political authority with its sword rightly extends into the area of eternal
life and salvation, into the area of"the soul" (LW 45: 105). Does the triune God
constitute political authority in such a way that political authority may "coerce
the people with their laws and commandments into believing this or that"?
The triune God constitutes political authority with "no power over souls,"
argues Luther, because "in matters which concern the salvation of souls nothing
but God's Word shall be taught and accepted" (HV 45: 106). Moreover, God does
not endow political authority as such with competencies for God's Word (HV
45:106-7). Matthew 16:18 and John 10:27 are decisive in this regard. Appropriate competencies are crucial. A court of law, for example, must have competencies in areas about which it renders judgment. "But the thoughts and
inclinations of the soul can be known to no one but God. Therefore, it is futile
and impossible to command or compel anyone by force to believe this or that.
The matter must be approached in a different way. Force will not accomplish it"
(LW 45: 107). In fact, it is counterproductive. "For faith is a free act, to which no
one can be forced. Indeed, it is a work of God in the spirit, not. something which
outward authority should compel or create. Hence arises the common saying,
found also in Augustine, 'No one can or ought to be forced to believe"' (HV
45: 108). God constitutes political authority with competencies, including "the
sword," delimited to the second table of the Decalogue, but not with competencies, and thus not with authority regarding the conscience, that have their moorings in the first commandment. 19 He argues for this limit on political authority
by expositing the words of Paul (Rom 13:3, 7), Peter (1 Pet 2: 13), Jesus (Matt
18. Johnson, Quest far Peace, 52.
19. In his lecture on Gen 9:6, Luther again specifies the Decalogue's second table as the sphere
of political authority's competence (LW'2: 14 I). At certain historical junctures, Luther appears to situate the competencies of political amhority, including the sword, not only with reference to the secoml table but also with reference to the second and third commandments as he numbers them.
Because the commandment "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain" pertains to
behaviors of the tongue, Luther at times thinks that political authority has God-given competencies
and thus responsibilities even in this area. The rationale for this position had been worked out in
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22:21), David (Ps 115:16), and Moses (Gen 1:26) and finds this biblical consensus poignantly consummated in the clausula Petri (Acts 5:29)-"we must obey
God rather than any human authority" (LW' 45: 110-11).
Luther extends this argument in On Wlzr against the Turlc (I 529). There he
insists that no war against the Turk can be fought as a holy war, "as though our
people were an army of Christians against the Turks, who were enemies of Christ.
This is absolutely contrary to Christ's doctrine and name" (LW' 46: 165, 168). It
would be "idolatry and blasphemy.... Think of all the heartbreak and misery
that have been caused by the crucirztri [the Crusades], by the indulgences [granted
to crusaders by Pope Urban II], and by crusade taxes" (LW' 46: 186). Already in
1518, 20 Luther had opposed war with the Turk "most of all" because it was being
urged by the papacy as a holy war crusade. 21
If there is to be a war fought with the Turks, it would have to be fought as a
justifiable war. First, such a war would have to be fought under the auspices of
the emperor and princes, not under those of the pope, the bishops, and the
church. Second, such a war could be fought only to protect the empire from an
expansionist war (LW' 46: 170, 185). While he did not doubt that the Turks
wanted to initiate an expansionist war, 22 Luther was suspicious that past Holy
Roman emperors and princes had desired "to go to war for [reasons] such as the
winning of great honor, glory, and wealth, the extension of territory, or wrath and
revenge and other such reasons" (LW' 46: 185). Any imminent war with the Turks
had to be fought "with repentance" (LW'46:171).

THE CAUSE QUESTION AND WAR REALISM
Luther indirectly takes up the just cause question by grounding the office of political authority in God's love and justice. The office of prince is an office of service.
1524 and again in the later 1530s under the very different circumstances of the question of armed
military resistance to the emperor. See W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, The Political Tl,ought ofJvfarti11
Luther, ed. Philip Broadhead (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books,
1984), 155-62; and idem, Studies in the Reformation: Lmher to Hooker, ed. C. W. Dugmore (London: Athlone, 1980), 31-32. This rationale also accompanies his 1543 advice that the political
authorities have the duty to discipline and even forcefully expel the Jewish population from Christian territories, since these Jews verbally and willfully deny the divinity of Christ (see LW 47:262-65;
Martin Bertram's helpful introduction to this treatise [pp. 123-36]; and I--leiko Oberman, 71,e Roots
ofAnti-Semitism: In the Age ofRenaisst111ce mui Refarmt1tion [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984]). The error
and evil of Luther's appraisal in these matters remains beyond dispute! See, e.g., Luther, Lttthemnism,
and the Jews, ed. J. Halperin and A. Sovik (Geneva: Department of Studies, Lutheran \'{forld Federation, 1984), 5-32; "Declaration of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America to the Jewish
Community," Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Department for Ecumenical Affairs,
http://www. elca.o rg/ ea/ lnterfai th/ jewish/ declaration. h trn I.
20. See Luther, Explmuttions ofthe Ni11e1yfive Tl,eses (1518), in LW31 :92.
21. For contemporary arguments against holy war crusades, see John R. Stumme, "A Lutheran
'Ihdition on Church and State," in Church t111d Stt1te: Lutheran Perspectives, ed. John Stumme and
Robert 'fottle (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 64-68.
22. LW' 46: 170. Luther's information on the 'lurks came especially from Ulrich von Hutten's

Exhorftltion to the Germ1111Princes(1518).
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"[I] nstead of thinking, 'The land and people belong to me, I will do what best
pleases me,' he thinks rather, 'I belong to the land and the people, I shall do what
is useful and good for them"' (LW 45: 120). The fundamental criterion of the
political authority's office of service is justice. When considering the content of
justice, Luther regularly turns to the second table of the Decalogue. He also notes
that the Scriptures frequently discuss and explicate second-table issues, often far
beyond the precise formulations that the Decalogue itself offers. Further, both
the Decalogue and Scripture's elaborations of the Decalogue's template of moral
justice are instances of natural law reasoning. Luther argues-most often on the
basis of Scripture itself-that the natural law of justice precedes and, therefore,
grounds both the Decalogue as recorded in Scripture and scriptural explications
of the Decalogue's template of moral topics. 23 For this reason, he regularly appeals
to the natural law of justice, often as inscribed in the Decalogue or the golden
rule or the second great commandment, as the crucial criterion for the functioning, positive law of a political region.
In his Commentary on Psalm 82 (1530), which reads like an essay on the virtuous prince, Luther takes up the issue of justice, which lies at the heart of the
just war tradition's cause question. He notes that second only to the princely vocation to secure the free opportunity for the church to teach God's Word is the
princely vocation "to help the poor, the orphans, and the widows to justice and
to further their cause. But, again, who can tell all the virtues that follow from this
one? For this virtue includes all the works of righteousness" (LW 13:53).
In a word, after the Gospel or the ministry, there is on earth no better jewel,
no greater treasure, nor richer alms, no fairer endowment, no finer possession than a ruler who makes and preserves just laws. Such men are rightly
called gods [in this psalm] .... [God] would have them full of great, innumerable, unspeakable good works, so that they may be partakers of His
divine majesty and help Him to do divine and superhuman works. (UV

13:54-55)

.

Even though Luther knows that the cause question in relation to war is "a farreaching question" (LW' 45: 124), he directly addresses it in Whether Soldiers Too
Can Be Saved. Political authority must meet a high bar.
No war is just, even ific is a war between equals, unless one has such a good
reason for fighting and such a good conscience that he can say, "My neighbor compels and forces me to fight, though I would rather avoid it." In chat
case, it can be called not only war, but lawful self-defense, for we must distinguish between wars that someone begins because chat is what he wanes
to do and does before anyone else attacks him, and chose wars chat are provoked when an attack is made by someone else. The first kind can be called
wars of desire; the second, wars of necessity. The first kind is of the devil;
23. Luther's most extensive single discussion of the relation of natural law and Scripture is in How
Christians Should Regard Moses (I 525). For a helpful review of Luther's view of natural law, see
Lazarcth, Christit111s in SocietJ\ 141-59.
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God does not give good fortune co the man who wages chat kind of war.
The second kind are human disasters; God help chem! (LW 46: 121) 24

Luther often warns "warmongers" by citing Ps 68:30: "He scatters the peoples
who delight in war" (LW 46: 118).
Regarding the cause question, the bar of"necessity" rather than "desire" places
the just war tradition in opposition to the traditions of"war realism." Precise definitions of"war realism" are hard to pin down. 25 There is in war realism an aspirational core: war is a calculated instrument exercised to fulfill some national
destiny. The just war tradition originates precisely in Cicero's opposition to the
escalating war realism of his own native empire. 26 An instructive example is Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Prussia had brought about Germanic unification under Otto von Bismarck in 1871; its goal was to expand its
leadership and to enlarge unification by encompassing other European nations
under Prussian hegemony. This Prussian spirit had been articulated already in the
early nineteenth century by Georg Hegel, who had argued that in world history
every ethnic people had a vocation to actualize and solidify itself by becoming a
state, and states were by necessity maintained by force. Further, each state had a
vocation to actualize its capacities to its furthest extent and thereby to expand its
influence and powers most fully. In this way, the course of world history manifested itself as a constant struggle for hegemony. The most excellent nation would
rule lesser nations for their own good. War was, therefore, the natural order
toward achieving a nation's God-given vocation to lead. 27
Often people who claim and desire to live according to the just war tradition
are actually operating within war realism. They unknowingly-though at times

24. Luther borrows this distinction between wars of desire and wars of necessity from Augustine
(see "Letter 189 ro Boniface," in Saint Augustine: Letters, vol. 4, 269). To my knowledge, Luther
confines wars of necessity to a defensive criterion only. 1wo other widdy accepted just cause criteria
are recovery of property and punishment (sec Leroy Walters, "The Simple Structure of the 'JustWar' Theory," in Peace, Politics, and the People of God, ed. Paul Peachey [Philadelphia: Fortress,
1986], 139).
25. See Duane Cady, From Wrzrism to Prtcijism: A Mom! Continuum (Philadelphia: 'Jemple
University Press, 1989), 21-23. 'J,vo other overviews of war realism can be found in 1erry Nardin,
"War and Peace, Philosophy of," in Rom/edge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Craig, 1" ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 9:684-91; and Sara Ruddick, "War and Peace," in Encyclopedirt ofEthics, ed. L. C. Becker and C. B. Becker, 2"'1ed. (New York: Routledge, 2001), 3: 1782-89.
See also Michael Howard, "The Causes of War," in A Pet1ce Reader: Essential Readings 011 W'ttr,
justice, Nonviolence, and W0rld Order, ed. J. Fahey and R. Armstrong (New York: Paulist, 1987),
7-8.
26. See M. 1i1llius Cicero, De officiis (LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961),
1.11-13 (pp. 13-15).
27. Hegel's war realism was taken up by other leading public thinkers of nineteenth-century Germany, including Leopold von Ranke, Heinrich von Treitschke, Max Weber, and others associated
with the "Prussian School of History." See John Moses's instructive analysis of Prussian war realism
in "Bonhoeffer's Germany: The Political Context," in The Camhridge Comp,mion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed. John W de Gruchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I 999), 3-10. For Hegel's
own analysis, see Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Great Books of the Western World 46;
Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), par. 259-360.
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knowingly and thereby maliciously-transfer the assumptions of war realism to
the just war tradition. 28 James T1.1rner Johnson captures this well:
In Western civilization the general term of the tradition that has grown up
ro justify and limit war is "just war theory." This term, however, is an imprecise one-ambiguous because of the variety of contexts out of which the just
war idea has arisen, because of the metamorphosis of the concept of just war
over time; because of the existence at any one time of numerous theories;
because of the imprecision of language, especially in equivalence of terms
between different languages; and, not least, because of the expectations of
many persons today regarding war, expectations that are transferred ro the
just war idea. 29

This transference has become a far too common occurrence since 9/11 and,
therefore, merits a special vigilance.
In his Treatise on Good Works (1520), Luther attends to the cause question by
combining Peter's clause (Acts 5:29) with God's "not kill" command:
But if, as often happens, the temporal power and authorities, or whatever
they call themselves, would compel a subject ro do something contrary ro
the command of God, or hinder him from doing what God commands,
obedience ends and the obligation ceases .... [It is] as if a prince desired to
go to war, and his cause was clearly umighteous; we should neither follow
nor help such a prince, because God had commanded us not to kill our
neighbor or do him a wrong .... In such cases we should indeed give up our
property and honor, our life and limb, so that God's commandments
remain. (LW44:100)

When the cause question is under deliberation, Luther readily reintroduces God's
"not kill" command!
We have seen how Luther takes up the pacifism question, the authority question, and the cause question. Like the broader just war tradition, he holds a strong
presumption against war grounded in God's "not kill" command, though often
stated only tacicly. From the perspective of the authority question, only government retains an exemption from the commandment, because political authority
is God's preferential earthly agent for enforcing the commandment. God's "not
kill" command emerges again, however, when the cause question is addressed.
Although Luther does not address the question of proportionality of means
in the prosecution of war and says nothing much beyond his counsel to show
mercy to the vanquished, he does address the conduct question in view of the
"not kill" command in his Treatise on GoodW'orks (1520). The "precious and lofty
work" of this commandment is "meekness" with respect not only to our family
and friends but especially to our enemies. "The temporal authorities [defend]

28. Sec Gary M. Simpson, "'By the Dawn's Early Light': The Flag, the Interrogative, and the
Whence and Whither of Normative Patriotism," W'ord and World 23 (2003): 272-83.
29. Johnson.]11st Wt1r Tradition and the Restraint ofWt1r, xxi.
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with the sword; the rest of us, by reproof and rebuke. But it is [to be done) with
pity for those who have earned the punishment" (LW 44: 103). Here Luther
specifically invokes the positive form of God's "not kill" command.

THE COMMAND'S POSITIVE FORM
AND JUST PEACEMAKING
Both Luther and Calvin discern a twofold dimension within the succinct yet
comprehensive "not kill" command. First, "not kill" is a synecdoche that excludes
all violence whatsoever toward ocher humans. 30 Second, and especially germane
to our purpose, is Calvin's thesis:
[I]n negative precepts, as they are called, the opposite affirmation is also to
be understood; else it would not be by any means consistent, that a person
would satisfy God's Law by merely abstaining from doing injury to others .... Nay, natural common sense demands more than that we should
abstain from wrong-doing. And, not to say more on this point, it will plainly
appear from the summary of the Second Table, that God not only forbids
us to be murderers, but also prescribes that every one should study faithfully
to defend the life of his neighbor, and practically to declare that it is dear to
him; for in that summary no mere negative phrase is used, but the words
expressly set forth that our neighbors are to be loved. It is unquestionable,
then, that of those whom God there commands to be loved, He here commends the[ir] lives to our care. 31

Luther employs chis same twofold hermeneutic when he composes the catechetical meaning of the commandment in his Small Catechism: "We are to fear and love
God, so chat we neither endanger nor harm the lives of our neighbors, but instead
help and support them in all of life's needs." 32 Here we are interested particularly
in the affirmative injunction introduced by the adversative conjunction ("but").
Luther elaborates in his Large Catechism aimed at instructing parents and pastors. The force of the negative form is that "God wanes to have everyone
defended, delivered, and protected from the wickedness and violence of others,
and he has placed this commandment as a wall, fortress, and refuge around our
neighbors, so that no one may do them bodily harm or injury." Now the force
of the tacit affirmative arises:
[T]his commandment is violated not only when we do evil, but also when
we have the opportunity to do good to our neighbors and to prevent, protect, and save them from suffering bodily harm or injury, but fail to do so.
If you send a naked person away when you could clothe him, you have let

30. See John Calvin, Commenttlries 011 the Four Last Books of!vfoses Arranged in the Form of,1 H,1rmony, trans. Charles W. Bingham (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1950), 3:20.
31. Ibid., 20-21.
32. Kolb and Wengert, The Book of Concord, 352.
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him freeze to death. If you see anyone who is suffering from hunger and do
not feed her, you have let her starve. Likewise, if you see anyone who is condemned to death or in similar peril and do not save him although you have
means and ways to do so, you have killed him. It will be of no help for you
to use the excuse that you did nor assist their deaths by word or deed, for
you have withheld your love from them and robbed them of the kindness
by means of which their lives might have been saved.
Therefore God rightly calls all persons murderers who do not offer counsel or assistance to those in need and peril of body and life. He will pass a
most terrible sentence upon them at the Last Day, as Christ himself declares.
[Matt 25:42-43]31
The negative form of the commandment places a protective boundary around
our physical life. The tacit affirmative sets in motion a life-generating bondingand-bridging into the physical life of neighbors. More recently, Walter Harrelson
notes the "sweeping generality" of this commandment, "surprising in its scope." 34
No wonder Karl Barth, borrowing Albert Schweitzer's phrase, interprets the area
marked out by God's "not kill" command primarily under the rubric of"respect
[reverence] for life," the implicit, sweeping affirmative, and only secondarily
under the rubric of "protection of life," which corresponds to the negative form
of the command. 35 Terence Fretheim observes that the negative form of much of
the Decalogue is "pertinent" in that the commandments "focus on the outer limits of conduct rather than specific behaviors .... Yet the commands implicitly
commend their positive side .... There is a certain comprehensiveness in their
ties to a considerable range of life experience." 36
Our analysis of Luther's exposition of law and political authority so far has
focused on the restraining dynamic of God's civil use of law (remedium pecmti)
and, correspondingly, on the political authority's sword exercised within the just
war tradition. But, as Luther emphasizes the affirmative implied in God's "not
kill" command, so he also underscores the positive life-generating side of the law's
civil use. This includes yet extends far beyond the sphere of political authority to
comprise family, labor, and what today has emerged as civil society. 37 Luther
occasionally recommends "a loaf of bread" as an additional, even alternative,
synecdoche for political authority. "It would therefore be fitting if the coat of
arms of every upright prince were emblazoned with a loaf of bread instead of a

33. Ibid., 412.
34. Walter Harrelson, 1Y1e Tm Co111111m1dme11ts ,md H111wm Rights, rev. ed. (Macon, GA: Mercer
University Press, 1997), 89.
35. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IIl/4, trans. A. T MacKay et al. (Edinburgh:'[ & 'I: Clark,
1957), 324-97.
36. Fretheim, Exodus, 221.
37. For my own exposition of civil society as an emerging divine arena for the life-generating side

of the law's civil use, see "'foward a Lutheran 'Delight in the Law of the Lord"'; idem, Critical Social
1Y1eory: Prophl'lic Reason, Civil Societ)\ and Christit111 lmagi11,1tirm (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002). Sec
also Gustav \Vingren's trenchant admonition against those who would reduce Luther's notion of the
civil use of the law to merely "an association with policies," which Luther himself sometimes did (Cre11tio11 mu! Lt1w [Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1961 ], 153).
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lion." 38 Luther forthrightly acknowledges other fundamental, socially generative
powers of political authority besides "the sword," without, of course, ever excluding the sword's restraining power. He considers these more socially generative
aspects of the political use of the law when the context is more "civically" situated. We could call this side of Luther's legacy "civic Lutheranism." 39
The twofold comprehensiveness of the 'fen Commandments entails a host of
"possible legitimate extensions." 40 The Scriptures themselves are replete with
such extensions, and "(t]his gives the people of God in every age an innerbiblicrtl
wrirrant to expand on them.»/4 1 A key characteristic for such extension, regarding
not only the boundary character of the negative form but also the bonding-andbridging character of the tacit affirmative form, is the distinctive and thoroughgoing entwinement of biblical law and narrative. 42 That the commandments are
placed within narrative
means chat the law is not viewed as eternally given in a certain form; it is
not immutable, never to be changed in its form or content. The laws arc
time-bound. The law is always intersecting with life as it is, filled with contingency and change, with complexity and ambiguity. Ir moves with the
times, taking human experience and insight into account, while remaining
constant in its objective: the best life for as many as possible. This constantly
changing life of the people of God means chat ever new laws are needed:
New occasions teach new duries. 43

The just war tradition's strong presumption against war entails one such new
duty, and the tacit positive form of the command, intertwined as it is with biblical narrative, strengthens the warrant for it.
38. Fourth Petition of the Lord's Prayer in the Large Catechism (Kolb and Wengert, Tl1e Book of

Concorcl, 450-51).
39. The complexion of civic Lutheranism diverges from that of "civic Calvinism." See Heinz
Schilling, Civic Gilvinism (Kirksville, MO: Sixteenth Century Journal, 1991). A sampling of Luther's
civicallysituated treatises includes The E·ttZteoflvftZrrit1ge (1522) (LW 45: 17-49); Ordiw111ceof11 Common Chest (1523) (LW 45: 169-9-1); Trade 11nd Usury (1524) (LW 45:245-310); and Jl Sermon 011
Keeping Children in School (1530) (LW -16:213-58). Carter Lindberg especially has highlighted the
socially generative aspect of Luther's view of political authority against the reductionistic interpretations by ErnstTrodtsch and Reinhold Niebuhr, which have dominated and skewed the hcrmeneutical imaginations of many interpreters of Luther, particularly in North America. See Lindberg, Beyond
Charity: Reformt1tion lniti11tives far the Poor (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 95-127, I 61-69. Cahill
includes, though rather briefly, the socially generative side of Luther's interpretation of political
authority (see Love Your Enemies, I 06-7).
40. Fretheim, E'<odus, 232.
1 I. Ibid., 222 (emphasis Fretheim's).
42. While Fretheim articulates no less than ten implications of this entwinement (see E'<odw,
201-7), I will focus only on one.
43. Ibid., 206. Luther's dialectical exposition in How Christians Should Reg11rd Moses moves in a
similar vein, though he appeals to natural law reasoning more forthrightly than does Frethcim (LW
35:161-74). I have a general agreement with Fretheim's view, though I remain unconvinced of his
formulation "the best life for as many as possible," which seems too tilted coward a Bentham-like utilitarianism. For a brief overview of utilitarianism and its problems and possibilities, see R. M. Hare,
"Utilitarianism," in The Westminster Dictionary of Christi1111 Ethics, ed. J. E Childress and J. Macquarrie (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 6-10-43.
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Plainly, the just war tradition's strong presumption against war emails an
equally strong, affirmative presumption for life, for just peacemaking. The peacekeeping, which a just war aims to accomplish, must exist within a comprehensive
environment of just peacemflking. Indeed, just peacemaking is the tacit presupposition for peacekeeping. Here the brilliance of the affirmative form of God's
"not kill" command glistens.
The varieties of the pacifist tradition have practiced expertise in just peacemaking. "Pacifism is a complex and subtle range of value positions on morality,
peace, and war, not the stereotyped extreme of conventional wisdom. The varieties of pacifism have emerged within a just-warist value tradition, to some degree
building on and extending that tradition." 44 Those within the just war tradition
must remember that pacifism has two sides: the "critical" side and the "positive"
side. The critical side is "no war, no violence, no sword, by anyone under any circumstances." The positive side of pacifism is "work tirelessly, vigorously, and endlessly for the establishment of peace according to just criteria." On the one hand,
the just war tradition cannot adopt the critical side of pacifism. This has most
often been the primary, even only, topic of conversation between the just war tradition and the variety of pacifist traditions. On the other hand, the just war tradition has every reason in the world to be allied with the historic pacifist
traditions-represented, for example, by the Mennonites and the Quakers-as
they have developed the positive side of just peacemaking. There is much to learn
and accomplish, 45 for as the psalmist declares, "justice and peace will kiss each
other" (Ps 85: IO).

44. Robert Phillips and Duane Cady, Hummzitt1rit1n lmervemion: Just W't1r vs. Pacifism (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 32-33. For ocher expositions of the varieties of pacifism, see John
Howard Yoder, Nevertheless: 7he Vt1rieties t1nd Shortcomings ofReligious l't1cijism (Scottsdale, PA: Herald, 1992); and Edward LeRoy Long Jr., W't1rtmd Conscience in Americ11 (Philadelphia: Westminster,
1968).
45. For the term "just peacemaking" and for a good introduction to this ecumenical approach,
see Glen Stassen, Just l'et1cemt1!,i11g: 7e11 l'mctices for Abolishing W't1r (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 1998); and
Jeffrey Gros and John Rempel, ed., 771e F,,1gmentatio11 of the Church 1111d Its Unity in i'Mcemaking
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 20(ll). For my own suggestions regarding this just peacemaking alliance
between the just war tradition and pacifism, see "Congregational Strategies for Invigorating
Lutheranism's Just Peacemaking 'Ji-adition."

